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To solve the free-rider problem, the literature has proposed various Lindahl mechanisms that attain Lindahl
allocations for public good economies as equilibrium outcomes of the games. But Saijo and Yamato [1999] have
proved that, for any Lindahl mechanism, some agents may have incentives not to participate in the mechanism.
To overcome such non-participation problems, Samejima [2004] has proposed to redesign Lindahl mech-
anisms. The present paper extends Samejima’s result to general allocation problems, and shows that non-
participation problems can be overcome for β∗-core mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that implement a sub-
correspondence of the β∗-core. The β∗-core in the present paper is a subset of the β-core proposed by Aumann
and Peleg [1960], but both cores are almost identical except for the treatment of indifference relations in the
definition of blocking. An example of β∗-core mechanisms is a Lindahl mechanism proposed by Walker [1981].
The present paper shows how to redesign β∗-core mechanisms to overcome non-participation problems.
Our redesigned mechanisms have three significant properties. First, agents are given opportunities to show
willingness not to participate in β∗-core mechanisms, possibly by passing over such willingness in silence. Sec-
ond, ‘non-participation decisions’ are used as messages for the redesigned mechanisms. Third, the redesigned
mechanisms respect the rights of non-participants in the sense that the mechanisms never interfere with actions
of non-participants. In spite of these properties, the redesigned mechanisms can implement a sub-correspondence
of the β∗-core in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
1. Introduction
This paper proposes a solution to non-participation problems for mechanisms that attain β∗-core allo-
cations in a general allocation model.
Lindahl equilibrium for public good economies has desirable properties such as Pareto efficiency
and individual rationality. However, in Lindahl equilibria, agents have incentives to under-report their
1
－ 120 －
valuations of public goods. Such incentives to misrepresent their preferences result in under-provisions
of the public goods. This is called the free-rider problem.
To solve the free-rider problem, economists have designed various mechanisms that attain Lindahl
allocations as equilibrium outcomes of the games. A mechanism in the field of game theory is also
called a game form. It specifies rules of the game; A game form consists of message spaces1 and an
outcome function.2 Lindahl mechanisms, which attain Lindahl allocations as equilibrium outcomes of
the games, have been proposed by Hurwicz [1979], Walker [1981], and so on.
However, Saijo and Yamato [1999] have proved that, for any Lindahl mechanism, some agents
may have incentives not to participate in the mechanism. The previous studies on mechanism design
implicitly assume that all agents participate in the proposed mechanism. If agents have the freedom
of non-participation, then they might not participate, knowing that they can free-ride on the public
goods provided by participants. This is what Saijo and Yamato call non-participation problems.
Why is non-participation a serious problem? We would like to point out two reasons. The first
reason is no-message problem. Since the mechanisms may not be able to get adequate messages from
non-participants, the mechanisms may not select a Lindahl allocation for the society as an outcome of
a message profile of all agents. The second reason is no-tax problem. Since the mechanisms cannot tax
non-participants and use their private resources for the provision of public goods, the mechanisms may
end up allowing non-participants to free-ride on the public goods provided by participants.
To overcome such non-participation problems, Samejima [2004] has proposed to redesign Lindahl
mechanisms. The redesigned mechanism incorporates the existing Lindahl mechanism as a component,
and offers a solution to problems of non-participation.
As a solution to no-message problem, Samejima has proposed to use ‘participation/non-participation
decisions’ as messages for the redesigned mechanisms. By doing so, the redesigned mechanisms can
receive some messages from all agents including both participants and non-participants in the incorpo-
rated Lindahl mechanisms. Although every agent may be able to choose to reveal no message for the
incorporated Lindahl mechanism, every agent necessarily reveals some message (i.e. participation/non-
participation decision) for the redesigned mechanism.
As for no-tax problem, there is not a solution because controlling private resources of non-participants
is considered to be an infringement of their property rights. But it is reasonable to assume that mech-
anisms are allowed to control private resources of participants because they have chosen participation
1Message spaces specify what kind of messages each agent should submit to the mechanism as his strategy.
2An outcome function in the standard studies specifies which allocation the mechanism selects as an outcome
of a given message profile.
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voluntarily with an agreement to follow the rules of the mechanisms. Such an assumption is standard in
the literature. Based on this assumption, Samejima’s redesigned mechanisms control private resources
of agents who have explicitly chosen to participate in the incorporated Lindahl mechanisms while the
redesigned mechanisms do not control private resources of agents who have chosen not to participate in
the incorporated Lindahl mechanisms. In the redesigned mechanisms, it is possible to control partici-
pants’ resources so that non-participants are induced to change their decisions and choose participation
in the incorporated Lindahl mechanisms.
The present paper extends the result by Samejima [2004] from public good provision problems
to general allocation problems. We show that for any mechanism that attains β∗-core allocations as
equilibrium outcomes, we can redesign the mechanism so that non-participation problems do not occur.
The β∗-core is almost identical to the β-core proposed by Aumann and Peleg [1960] for cooperative
games without side payments. The difference between the β∗-core and the β-core lies in the treatment
of indifference relations in the definition of blocking.
In addition to the generality of the model, the present paper differs from Samejima [2004] in
that we use equilibrium notions that are more standard in the literature. Samejima [2004] has defined
order-independent subgame-perfect equilibrium for his analysis, but the present paper employs subgame-
perfect equilibrium proposed by Selten [1975]. Furthermore, in its attempt to generalize the model,
Samejima [2004] has defined the core under a, where a represents a specific joint action profile, but
this notion of the core is far from standard. The present paper employs the β∗-core, which is almost
identical to the β-core that is classical in the literature.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains a model of general
allocation problems and introduces the notions of the β∗-core and mechanisms. Section 3 presents our
result, and Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
2–1. The general environment
The set of agents in the society is denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We assume that |N | ≥ 2. A coalition
is a non-empty subset of N and it is denoted typically by S. The set of allocations in the society is
denoted by X̄. For example, an allocation x ∈ X̄ represents a distribution of private goods among
agents and an amount of public goods provided in the society.
We assume that an allocation is realized as a result of actions of all agents. The set of feasible actions
for a coalition S is denoted by AS . For notational convenience, a{i} and A{i} are simply denoted by ai
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and Ai, respectively. For example, agent i’s action ai ∈ Ai represents his decision about an amount of
private consumption of his endowments and an amount of his contributions for the provision of public
goods in the society. Let h : AN → X̄ be a function that assigns an allocation to each action of N .
We assume that an action of a proper subset S � N of agents cannot determine a specific allocation
in the society. That is, it is actions of all agents that can determine an allocation in the society. This
is because an allocation may represent an amount of goods with externalities: non-excludable public
goods, air pollution, and so on. For example, an amount of pollution in the society is determined by
summing up an amount of pollution emitted by all agents, not by a proper subset of agents. We say
that an allocation x ∈ X̄ is feasible if x = h(aN ) for some aN ∈ AN . The set of feasible allocations is
denoted by X.
Each agent i has a complete and transitive preference relation Ri defined over X̄. As usual, xRi x
′
means that x is at least as good as x′ for agent i. The associated strict preference relation is denoted
by Pi. That is, x Pi x
′ means that agent i prefers x to x′. Let Ri be the set of admissible preferences
of agent i. A preference profile of a coalition S is denoted by RS ≡ (Ri)i∈S and the set of admissible
preference profiles of a coalition S is denoted by RS ≡ ×i∈SRi.
A social choice correspondence φ : RN ⇒ X is a set-valued function that assigns a non-empty subset
of feasible allocations to each profile of preferences of all agents.
A coalition S is said to β-block a feasible allocation x ∈ X if for each aN\S ∈ AN\S , there exists
aS ∈ AS such that h(aS , aN\S)Pix for all i ∈ S.3 A feasible allocation x ∈ X is a β-core allocation if no
coalition can β-block x. Given a preference profile RN ∈ RN , we obtain the set of β-core allocations,
which we denote by C(RN ).
The above definition of β-blocking is standard in the literature, but we consider a slightly different
definition to obtain the result of the present paper. A coalition S is said to β∗-block a feasible allocation
x ∈ X if for each aN\S ∈ AN\S , there exists aS ∈ AS such that h(aS , aN\S) ̸= x and h(aS , aN\S)Ri x
for all i ∈ S. A feasible allocation x ∈ X is a β∗-core allocation if no coalition can β∗-block x. Given
a preference profile RN ∈ RN , we obtain the set of β∗-core allocations, which we denote by C∗(RN ).
The difference between the β∗-core and the β-core lies in the treatment of indifference relations in
the definition of blocking. Note that if S can β-block x, then S can also β∗-block x. Therefore,
C∗(RN ) ⊂ C(RN ).
In general, the set of β∗-core allocations may be the empty set.4 But if the set of β∗-core alloca-
3In the definition of β-blocking as well as in the definition of β∗-blocking to follow, we allow the case S = N .
In this case, the phrase ‘for each aN\S ∈ AN\S ’ is vacuous.
4In some models, the existence of β∗-core allocations is guaranteed as we discuss in Section 2–2.
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tions is non-empty and a social choice correspondence φ selects β∗-core allocations for all admissible
preference profiles, that is, if φ(RN ) ⊂ C∗(RN ) ̸= ∅ for all RN ∈ RN , then we say that φ is a
sub-correspondence of the β∗-core.
A mechanism Γ is an extensive game form as studied in Moore and Repullo [1988]. The mechanism
consists of a game tree with a set of message choices available to agents at each information set, an
outcome function, and a set of participants at the initial node. Unlike the standard studies in the
literature, we consider the possibility that the set of participants in the mechanism may vary as play
proceeds.
A participant in the mechanism is defined as an agent who has voluntarily and explicitly chosen
to follow the rules of the mechanism. In other words, a participant i is an agent who has allowed the
mechanism to control his action. An agent who is not a participant is a non-participant. For each node t
in the game tree, we denote the set of participants at node t by T (t). Particularly, the set of participants
at the initial node of the mechanism is denoted by T . If a non-participant has an opportunity in the
game tree to show his willingness to participate, then he can become a participant. So, if a node t is a
predecessor of a node t′, then we have T (t) ⊂ T (t′).5 The standard studies assume that all agents are
participants at the initial node, that is, T = N . However, in Section 3, we will consider the case where
no agent is a participant at the initial node, that is, T = ∅.
The outcome function of the mechanism associates with each terminal node t an action of the
set of participants, atT (t) ∈ AT (t). So, at the terminal node t, the mechanism controls actions of the
participants in T (t) while it never interferes with actions of the non-participants in N \T (t). We assume
that the set of non-participants will take some action atN\T (t) ∈ AN\T (t) for their own benefit after
watching the action atT (t) of the participants.
6
Agent i’s strategy mi is a function that associates agent i’s message choice from available choices
with each information set for which he is on the move. We do not consider mixed strategies in the
present paper. The set of agent i’s strategies is also called agent i’s message space and denoted by Mi.
We note that in the above definition of agent i’s strategy, we do not assume that he is a participant.
This is because in the redesigned mechanism that we discuss in Section 3, a non-participant inevitably
chooses a strategy, where he reveals a message telling that he has chosen non-participation.
5In other words, non-participants can become participants but not vice versa. We consider that this assump-
tion may not be unreasonable because participants have voluntarily allowed the mechanism to control their
actions. Furthermore, we note that the assumption in the standard studies is much more stronger; They take it
for granted that all agents are participants at the initial node.





A strategy profile of a coalition S of agents is denoted by mS ≡ (mi)i∈S . The set of strategy profiles
of S is denoted by MS ≡ ×i∈SMi, which is also called message spaces of S. Given a strategy profile
mN of all agents, we can associate with mN a terminal node t, and by using the outcome function, we
can also associate with mN an action a
t
T (t) of the participants at the terminal node t. Furthermore, we
can associate with mN an action a
t
N\T (t) that the non-participants at the terminal node t choose for
their own benefit after watching atT (t). So, we can define an outcome allocation function g : MN → X
as follows; For each mN ∈ MN , let g(mN ) ≡ h(atT (t), atN\T (t)), where T (t) is the set of participants at
the terminal node t associated with mN .
A list (Γ, RN ) defines an extensive game. A strategy profile mN is a Nash equilibrium of (Γ, RN ) if
no agent can benefit by changing his strategy while the others keep their strategies unchanged; That is,
g(mN )Ri g(m
′
i,mN\{i}) for all i ∈ N and for all m′i ∈ Mi. A strategy profile mN is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium of (Γ, RN ) if in every subgame of (Γ, RN ), the strategy profile induced by mN is a Nash
equilibrium. By definition, a strategy profilemN is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of (Γ, RN ) if and only
if the strategy profile induced by mN is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in every subgame of (Γ, RN ).
Let NE(Γ, RN ) be the set of Nash equilibrium allocations corresponding to the Nash equilibria of the
game (Γ, RN ).
7 Let SPE(Γ, RN ) be the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium allocations corresponding
to the subgame-perfect equilibria of the game (Γ, RN ).
8
We say that a mechanism Γ implements a social choice correspondence φ in Nash equilibrium if
NE(Γ, RN ) = φ(RN ) for all RN ∈ RN . Similarly, we say that a mechanism Γ implements a social
choice correspondence φ in subgame-perfect equilibrium if SPE(Γ, RN ) = φ(RN ) for all RN ∈ RN .
These notions of implementation are called full implementation in the literature.
2–2. An example of the β∗-core in public good economies
This section shows that Lindahl allocations are β∗-core allocations in public good economies with
strictly convex preferences defined over consumption spaces with one private good and one pure public
good.
Each agent i ∈ N consumes one private good xi ∈ R+ and one pure public good y ∈ R+, where
y should be common among all agents.9 An allocation in the society is denoted typically by x ≡
((xi)i∈N , y) and the set of allocations is denoted by X̄ = Rn+1+ . Each agent i is initially endowed with
a positive amount wi > 0 of the private good and no public good, y = 0. Define w ≡
∑
i∈N wi.
7That is, NE(Γ, RN ) ≡ {x ∈ X : x = g(mN ) for some Nash equilibrium mN of (Γ, RN )}.
8That is, SPE(Γ, RN ) ≡ {x ∈ X : x = g(mN ) for some subgame-perfect equilibrium mN of (Γ, RN )}.
9R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.
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Each agent i’s preference relation Ri defined over X̄ is represented by a utility function ui(xi, y)
where ui is increasing in both arguments and ui is strictly quasi-concave.
10 That is, agent i’s preference
relation Ri is strongly monotone and strictly convex over his consumption space R2+.
Agent i’s feasible action is ai = (xi, ci) ∈ Ai ≡ {(xi, ci) ∈ R2+ : xi+ ci ≤ wi} where ci is the amount
of his private good that he contributes for the production of the public good.11 Define c ≡
∑
i∈N ci.
An action of a coalition S is denoted by aS = (ai)i∈S ∈ AS ≡ ×i∈SAi.
There is a production technology that transforms the private good into the public good, which is
represented by an increasing, concave production function f : R+ → R+ with f(0) = 0. As a result of
an action aN ∈ AN of all agents, they realize an allocation h(aN ) = ((xi)i∈N , y) ∈ X̄ where y = f(c).
The set of feasible allocations is denoted by X ≡ {x ∈ X̄ : x = h(aN ) for some aN ∈ AN}.
We now define a Lindahl equilibrium. Let p0 ∈ R+ denote a price of the private good and let
pi ∈ R+ denote a personalized price of the public good for agent i ∈ N . A Lindahl equilibrium with
respect to (wi)i∈N is a feasible allocation x = ((xi)i∈N , y) and a price system (p0, (pi)i∈N ) with the
following properties, L1, L2, and L3.
L1. Profit maximization. y = f(c) and
∑
i∈N pi · y − p0 · c ≥
∑
i∈N pi · y
′ − p0 · c′ for all (y′, c′)
with y′ = f(c′) and c′ ∈ [0, w].
L2. Utility maximization. For all i ∈ N , we have p0 ·xi+pi ·y ≤ p0 ·wi, and if ui(x′i, y′) > ui(xi, y),
then p0 · x′i + pi · y′ > p0 · wi.
L3. Market clearing.
∑
i∈N xi + c = w.
A Lindahl allocation is a feasible allocation x = ((xi)i∈N , y) for which there exists a price system
(p0, (pi)i∈N ) that satisfies L1, L2, and L3. The existence of a Lindahl equilibrium in the current setting
can be shown by applying the theorem due to Foley [1970] with some modifications. The following
proposition is also a modification of Foley’s result. However, we would like to emphasize the importance
of strict convexity of preferences to obtain the proposition.
Proposition 1. A Lindahl allocation is a β∗-core allocation.
Proof. Let x = ((xi)i∈N , y) and (p0, (pi)i∈N ) be a Lindahl equilibrium. By way of contradiction,
suppose that there exists a coalition S ⊂ N , possibly S = N , that can β∗-block x.








i) = (wi, 0) for all i ∈ N \ S. Since S can β∗-block




i))i∈S ∈ AS such that h(aS , aN\S) ̸= x and h(aS , aN\S) Ri x for all i ∈ S.
10We say that ui is strictly quasi-concave if ui(αxi + (1 − α)x′i, αy + (1 − α)y′) > min{ui(xi, y), ui(x′i, y′)}
for all α ∈ (0, 1) and for all (xi, y) and (x′i, y′) such that (xi, y) ̸= (x′i, y′).








′ = f(c′). Note that h(aS , aN\S) = ((x
′
i)i∈N , y
′). So, we must have the fact
that ((x′i)i∈N , y
′) ̸= ((xi)i∈N , y) and ui(x′i, y′) ≥ ui(xi, y) for all i ∈ S.
We first claim that
∑
i∈N pi · y




i − wi) ≤ 0. By L2 and strong monotonicity of
preferences, we have p0 ·xi+pi ·y = p0 ·wi for all i ∈ N and hence
∑
i∈N pi ·y+p0 ·
∑
i∈N (xi−wi) = 0.
This equality and L3 imply that
∑
i∈N pi · y − p0 · c = 0. Furthermore, by L1 and the fact that
x′i + c
′
i ≤ wi for all i ∈ N , we obtain 0 ≥
∑
i∈N pi · y
′ − p0 · c′ ≥
∑
i∈N pi · y





Since x′i = wi for all i ∈ N \ S, we obtain the claim.
We next claim that
∑
i∈N pi · y




i − wi) ≥ 0. By L2 and strong monotonicity of








Since pi · y′ ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N \ S, we obtain the claim.
The previous two claims imply that
∑
i∈N pi · y




i − wi) = 0. Furthermore, since
p0 · x′i + pi · y′ ≥ p0 ·wi for all i ∈ S and pi · y′ ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N \ S as we noted previously, it must be
the case that p0 · x′i + pi · y′ = p0 · wi for all i ∈ S and pi · y′ = 0 for all i ∈ N \ S.
We claim that (x′i, y
′) = (xi, y) for all i ∈ S. Suppose that there is j ∈ S such that (x′j , y′) ̸= (xj , y).
Let (x′′j , y
′′) = (0.5x′j+0.5xj , 0.5y
′+0.5y). By strict convexity of agent j’s preference, that is, by strict
quasi-concavity of uj , we have the fact that uj(x
′′
j , y
′′) > min{uj(x′j , y′), uj(xj , y)} = uj(xj , y), which
in turn implies that p0 ·x′′j +pj ·y′′ > p0 ·wj by L2. However, this inequality is in contradiction with the
equality p0 ·x′′j +pj ·y′′ = p0 ·wj , which must hold since p0 ·x′j+pj ·y′ = p0 ·wj and p0 ·xj+pj ·y = p0 ·wj .
By the last claim, we must have y′ = y. We next show that y′ = y = 0. If y′ > 0, then, for all
i ∈ N \ S, pi · y′ = 0 implies pi = 0. When pi = 0, there does not exist (xi, y) that satisfies L2 since
agent i’s preference is strongly monotone. This non-existence is in contradiction with our assumption
that x is a Lindahl allocation. So, we must have y′ = y = 0.
The fact that p0 · xi + pi · y = p0 · wi together with y = 0 implies that xi = wi for all i ∈ N .
Recall that we have x′i = wi for all i ∈ N \ S and (x′i, y′) = (xi, y) for all i ∈ S. So, we obtain
((x′i)i∈N , y
′) = ((xi)i∈N , y). However, this contradicts the fact that h(aS , aN\S) ̸= x.
3. The Result
3–1. The mechanism
Throughout the remaining part of this paper, let a social choice correspondence φ be a compact-
valued12 sub-correspondence of the β∗-core, and let a mechanism Γ be a game form that implements
12We say that φ is compact-valued if φ(RN ) is a compact set for all RN ∈ RN .
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′
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′). So, we must have the fact
that ((x′i)i∈N , y
′) ̸= ((xi)i∈N , y) and ui(x′i, y′) ≥ ui(xi, y) for all i ∈ S.
We first claim that
∑
i∈N pi · y
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∑
i∈N pi ·y+p0 ·
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∑
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Since pi · y′ ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N \ S, we obtain the claim.
The previous two claims imply that
∑
i∈N pi · y




i − wi) = 0. Furthermore, since
p0 · x′i + pi · y′ ≥ p0 ·wi for all i ∈ S and pi · y′ ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N \ S as we noted previously, it must be
the case that p0 · x′i + pi · y′ = p0 · wi for all i ∈ S and pi · y′ = 0 for all i ∈ N \ S.
We claim that (x′i, y
′) = (xi, y) for all i ∈ S. Suppose that there is j ∈ S such that (x′j , y′) ̸= (xj , y).
Let (x′′j , y
′′) = (0.5x′j+0.5xj , 0.5y
′+0.5y). By strict convexity of agent j’s preference, that is, by strict
quasi-concavity of uj , we have the fact that uj(x
′′
j , y
′′) > min{uj(x′j , y′), uj(xj , y)} = uj(xj , y), which
in turn implies that p0 ·x′′j +pj ·y′′ > p0 ·wj by L2. However, this inequality is in contradiction with the
equality p0 ·x′′j +pj ·y′′ = p0 ·wj , which must hold since p0 ·x′j+pj ·y′ = p0 ·wj and p0 ·xj+pj ·y = p0 ·wj .
By the last claim, we must have y′ = y. We next show that y′ = y = 0. If y′ > 0, then, for all
i ∈ N \ S, pi · y′ = 0 implies pi = 0. When pi = 0, there does not exist (xi, y) that satisfies L2 since
agent i’s preference is strongly monotone. This non-existence is in contradiction with our assumption
that x is a Lindahl allocation. So, we must have y′ = y = 0.
The fact that p0 · xi + pi · y = p0 · wi together with y = 0 implies that xi = wi for all i ∈ N .
Recall that we have x′i = wi for all i ∈ N \ S and (x′i, y′) = (xi, y) for all i ∈ S. So, we obtain
((x′i)i∈N , y
′) = ((xi)i∈N , y). However, this contradicts the fact that h(aS , aN\S) ̸= x.
3. The Result
3–1. The mechanism
Throughout the remaining part of this paper, let a social choice correspondence φ be a compact-
valued12 sub-correspondence of the β∗-core, and let a mechanism Γ be a game form that implements
12We say that φ is compact-valued if φ(RN ) is a compact set for all RN ∈ RN .
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φ in subgame-perfect equilibrium. That is, SPE(Γ, RN ) = φ(RN ) ⊂ C∗(RN ) ̸= ∅ for all RN ∈ RN .
We allow that the mechanism Γ to be a single-stage simultaneous-move game form that implements φ
in Nash equilibrium because, for such a game form, we have the fact that NE(Γ, RN ) = SPE(Γ, RN )
for all RN ∈ RN . We assume that the mechanism Γ consists of the set of strategy profiles of all agents
MN , the associated outcome allocation function g : MN → X, and the set of participants at the initial
node T = N . We call the mechanism Γ a β∗-core mechanism. Examples of β∗-core mechanisms include
Lindahl mechanisms proposed by Hurwicz [1979] and Walker [1981] in public good economies with
strictly convex preferences discussed in Section 2–2. Since T = N is assumed for Γ, it is assumed that
all agents are participants at the initial node of the mechanism as in the standard studies.
We introduce some notations. For each RN ∈ RN , we define the least preferred allocation in φ(RN )
for agent i, which is denoted by xi(RN ).
13 That is, we have xi(RN ) ∈ φ(RN ) and x Ri xi(RN ) for all
x ∈ φ(RN ).
For each RN ∈ RN , x ∈ C∗(RN ), and a coalition S � N , we denote by aN\S(RN , x) an action
of N \ S that prevents S from β∗-blocking x under RN . That is, for all aS ∈ AS , we have either
x = h(aS , aN\S(RN , x)) or x Pi h(aS , aN\S(RN , x)) for some i ∈ S. The existence of aN\S(RN , x) is
guaranteed because x ∈ C∗(RN ) and hence S cannot β∗-block x.14
We now describe how to redesign the β∗-core mechanism Γ and obtain Γ∗. We emphasize three
significant properties of the redesigned mechanism Γ∗.
Property 1. T = ∅ is assumed for Γ∗, so no agent is a participant at the initial node of Γ∗. Each
agent is given an opportunity in Γ∗ to show his willingness to become a participant.
Property 2. Since ‘participation/non-participation decisions’ are used as messages for Γ∗, every
agent inevitably reveals some message. Even if some agent tries to reveal no message by remaining
silent, such a behavior is interpreted as choosing non-participation. So, no-message problem does not
occur.
Property 3. At each terminal node t, the redesigned mechanism controls an action atT (t) of the
participants at the node t. Since Γ∗ never interferes with actions of the non-participants, and since
the non-participants can freely choose their action atN\T (t) for their own benefit, we could say that the
rights of the non-participants are respected. Furthermore, since each participant has voluntarily chosen
participation, his own free will is respected, too.
13If there are multiple least preferred allocations in φ(RN ) for agent i, we pick one of them arbitrarily and
denote it by xi(RN ).
14If there are multiple actions of N \ S that prevent S from β∗-blocking x under RN , we pick one of them
arbitrarily and denote it by aN\S(RN , x).
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The redesigned mechanism Γ∗ based on Γ.
The redesigned mechanism Γ∗ consists a game tree with message spaces M∗N , an outcome function,
and the empty set of participants at the initial node. That is, no agent is regarded as a participant at
the beginning. The following descriptions define the game tree, M∗N , and the outcome function.
Phase 1. This is a simultaneous-move phase. Each agent i is asked to report (zi, RiN , x
i) ∈
N0 × RN × X simultaneously, where N0 denotes the set of non-negative integers and it is required
that xi ∈ φ(RiN ). If zi = 0, agent i is regarded as choosing to become a participant. If zi ≥ 1,
agent i is regarded as choosing to become a non-participant. Each agent i has the right to remain
silent completely or partially, but then he is regarded as choosing zi = 1 to become a non-participant,
and (RiN , x
i) with xi ∈ φ(RiN ) is chosen by the mechanism randomly. If agent i’s report does not
conform to the rules, for example, if xi /∈ φ(RiN ), then he is also regarded as choosing to become a
non-participant and his message is replaced by a randomly chosen message (zi, RiN , x
i) with zi = 1 and
xi ∈ φ(RiN ).
Case 1. If zi = 0 for all i ∈ N , then the play proceeds to phase 2–1. This is the case where all
agents have chosen participation.
Case 2. If there exists j ∈ N such that zi = 0 ̸= zj for all i ∈ N \ {j}, then the play stops. This
is the case where only agent j has chosen non-participation.
At this terminal node t, the outcome function defines an action of the set of participants T (t) =




N )) where R
j−1
N is interpreted as R
n
N if j = 1.
15 In words,
the outcome at this terminal node is such that participants take actions that prevent agent j from
β∗-blocking his least preferred allocation in φ(Rj−1N ) where R
j−1
N is a preference profile reported by
another agent next to j.
Case 3. If neither case 1 nor 2 applies, then the play proceeds to phase 2–2. This is the case where
at least two agents have chosen non-participation.
Phase 2–1. This phase is reached when case 1 applies in phase 1. So, all agents are participants at
the beginning of this phase. Here, the β∗-core mechanism Γ is used as a component of the redesigned
mechanism Γ∗. All agents are asked to play a game in Γ with message spaces MN and an outcome
allocation function g. When the game in Γ reaches its terminal node, the play in Γ∗ also stops.




N )) is well-defined since xj(R
j−1
N ) ∈ φ(R
j−1
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At each terminal node in Γ, the outcome function of Γ∗ defines actions of all agents so that the
resulting outcome allocation conforms to g.
Phase 2–2. This phase is reached when case 3 applies in phase 1. So, at least two agents are
non-participants at the beginning of this phase. Denote the set and the number of non-participants
at the beginning of this phase by S1 ≡ {i ∈ N : zi ≥ 1} and k̄ ≡ |S1|, respectively. Let agent i∗ be
the non-participant with the least index number among those who have reported the largest integer in
phase 1. That is, i∗ ≡ min{i ∈ S1 : i ∈ argmaxj∈S1 zj}. Phase 2–2 consists of k̄ rounds described as
follows.
Round k ∈ {1,2, . . . , k̄ − 1}. Each non-participant i ∈ Sk is asked to report zik ∈ {0, 1}
sequentially from the non-participant with the least index number to those with larger ones.
If zik = 0, non-participant i is regarded as changing his mind and choosing to become a participant.
In this case, the set of non-participants is updated, i.e., Sk+1 ≡ Sk \ {i}, and the play proceeds to the
next round k + 1 even if some non-participants are not yet asked in the ongoing round k.
If zik = 1, non-participant i is regarded as choosing to remain a non-participant. If non-participant i
remains silent or his report does not conform to the rules, then he is regarded as choosing zik = 1 to
remain a non-participant. In this case, another non-participant j ∈ Sk with a next larger index number
is asked to report zjk ∈ {0, 1} in the ongoing round k.
Non-participant j is treated in the same way as non-participant i. If zjk = 0, he becomes a
participant and the play proceeds to the next round k + 1 with the updated set of non-participants
Sk+1 ≡ Sk \ {j}. If zjk = 1, another non-participant is asked in the ongoing round k. The play in the
round k continues similarly, either until the next round k + 1 is reached after some non-participant
chooses participation, or until all non-participants in Sk sequentially choose non-participation in a row.
The play stops in the round k without proceeding to the next round only when all non-participants
in Sk sequentially choose non-participation in a row, that is, only when z
i
k = 1 for all i ∈ Sk. At this
terminal node t, the outcome function defines an action of the set of participants T (t) = N \ Sk by
atT (t) = aN\Sk (R
i∗
N , x
i∗).16 In words, the outcome at this terminal node is such that participants take





N . In the special
case where T (t) = ∅ at the terminal node t, the outcome function associates nothing with the node
t since no agent is a participant at t. Such a case occurs only when S1 = N and the play stops in
round 1.
16We note that aN\Sk (R
i∗
N , x
i∗ ) is well-defined since xi






Round k̄. In this round, there remains only one non-participant i in Sk̄. He is asked to report
zik̄ ∈ {0, 1}.
If zik̄ = 0, non-participant i becomes the last participant and the play stops. In this case, all agents
have chosen participation in the end. At this terminal node t, the outcome function defines an action
atT (t) of the set of participants T (t) = N so that h(a
t
T (t)) = x




If zik̄ = 1, non-participant i remains a non-participant and the play stops. At this terminal





Theorem. Suppose that φ be a compact-valued sub-correspondence of the β∗-core. Let Γ∗ be
the redesigned mechanism obtained from a β∗-core mechanism Γ, for which we have the fact that
SPE(Γ, RN ) = φ(RN ) ⊂ C∗(RN ) ̸= ∅ for all RN ∈ RN . Then, the redesigned mechanism Γ∗, which has
Properties 1, 2 and 3, implements φ in subgame-perfect equilibrium. That is, SPE (Γ∗, RN ) = φ(RN )
for all RN ∈ RN .
This theorem is our main result. The following two sections prove the theorem.
3–2. Proof: SPE(Γ∗,RN) ⊂ φ(RN) for all RN ∈ RN .
Choose any arbitrary RN ∈ RN and fix it throughout this section. This RN is regarded as a ‘true’
preference profile of agents.
We first focus on subgames that start at the beginning of round 1 in phase 2–2. We note that
there are infinitely many such subgames because case 3 applies for infinitely many message profiles
reported in phase 1. Before any such subgame starts, the set of non-participants S1, the number of
non-participants k̄, and non-participant i∗ who has reported the largest integer are already given.





∈ φ(RN ), then the outcome allocation is xi
∗
in the subgame-perfect equilibria of this subgame
given that the ‘true’ preference profile of agents is RN .
Proof. We use backward induction arguments to prove the lemma.
First, consider any subgame that starts at the beginning of round k̄ and take any subgame-perfect
equilibrium for this subgame. In round k̄, there remains only one non-participant i, who is asked to
report zik̄ ∈ {0, 1}.
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If zik̄ = 0 on the equilibrium path, then the outcome allocation is x
i∗ as desired.
If zik̄ = 1 on the equilibrium path, then the outcome allocation is x




ati is chosen by non-participant i for his own benefit at the terminal node t. Since non-participant i has
an opportunity to change his report into zik̄ = 0 and realize x
i∗ but the equilibrium allocation is x′, it
must be the case that non-participant i weakly prefers x′ to xi
∗
, that is, x′ Ri x




i∗) and by the assumption Ri
∗
N = RN of the lemma, we must have the fact that x
′ = xi
∗




Second, assume that it has been proved that the subgame-perfect equilibrium allocation is xi
∗
for
every subgame that starts at the beginning of round k + 1, where k is some number in {1, . . . , k̄ − 1}.
Consider any subgame that starts at the beginning of round k and take any subgame-perfect equilibrium
for this subgame. In round k, each non-participant i ∈ Sk is asked to report zik ∈ {0, 1} sequentially.
If zik = 0 for some i ∈ Sk on the equilibrium path, that is, if any one non-participant chooses to
become a participant in round k on the equilibrium path, then round k+1 is reached on the path. By
the induction assumption, the outcome allocation is xi
∗
as desired.
If zik = 1 for all i ∈ Sk on the equilibrium path, that is, if all non-participants in Sk sequentially
choose non-participation in a row in round k on the equilibrium path, then the outcome allocation is
x′ ≡ h(atSk , aN\Sk (R
i∗
N , x
i∗)) where atSk is chosen by the non-participants in Sk for their own benefit at
the terminal node t. Note that each non-participant i ∈ Sk has an opportunity to change his report into
zik = 0 and reach round k+1 to realize x
i∗ , which is, by the induction assumption, the subgame-perfect
equilibrium allocation of every subgame that starts at the beginning of round k + 1. Nevertheless, the
equilibrium allocation is not xi
∗
but x′. So, it must be the case that every non-participant i ∈ Sk
weakly prefers x′ to xi
∗
, that is, x′ Ri x






N = RN of the lemma, we must have the fact that x
′ = xi
∗
as desired, because it is
not the case that xi
∗
Pi x
′ for some i ∈ Sk.
We next focus on the game (Γ∗, RN ) as a whole and its subgame-perfect equilibria. Three cases of
phase 1 are considered in Lemmas 2 through 4.
Lemma 2. Consider any subgame-perfect equilibrium m∗N ∈ M∗N of (Γ∗, RN ) and its outcome
allocation x ∈ SPE(Γ∗, RN ). If case 3 of phase 1 applies on the equilibrium path, then x ∈ φ(RN ).
Proof. When case 3 of phase 1 applies, at least two agents have chosen positive integers in phase 1.
In this case, every agent i has an opportunity to change his report of zi into an integer that is larger
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than any other agent’s, that is, zi such that zi > zj for all j ∈ N \ {i}. By reporting such zi, agent i
can reach a subgame that starts at the beginning of round 1 in phase 2–2 as agent i∗. Furthermore,
by reporting such zi together with RiN = RN and x
i ∈ φ(RN ), agent i can realize xi, which is, by
Lemma 1, the subgame-perfect equilibrium allocation of the subgame in phase 2–2. Therefore, every
agent i has an opportunity to realize any allocation in φ(RN ).
Nevertheless, the equilibrium allocation is x. So, it must be the case that every agent i weakly
prefers x to any allocation in φ(RN ), that is, for all i ∈ N , we have x Ri x′ for all x′ ∈ φ(RN ). Since
φ is a sub-correspondence of the β∗-core and any allocation in φ(RN ) is a β
∗-core allocation, we must
have the fact that x = x′ for all x′ ∈ φ(RN ), that is, φ(RN ) = {x}.
Lemma 3. Consider any subgame-perfect equilibrium m∗N ∈ M∗N of (Γ∗, RN ) and its outcome
allocation x ∈ SPE(Γ∗, RN ). If case 1 of phase 1 applies on the equilibrium path, then x ∈ φ(RN ).
Proof. When case 1 of phase 1 applies on the equilibrium path, the play proceeds to phase 2–1
where the β∗-core mechanism Γ is played by all agents. So, the outcome allocation x is realized at
some terminal node in Γ. Since the strategy profile mN ∈ MN induced by m∗N is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium for the subgame (Γ, RN ), it must be the case that g(mN ) = x ∈ SPE (Γ, RN ). Since Γ
implements φ in subgame-perfect equilibrium, we have the fact that x ∈ φ(RN ).
Lemma 4. Consider any subgame-perfect equilibrium m∗N ∈ M∗N of (Γ∗, RN ) and its outcome
allocation x ∈ SPE(Γ∗, RN ). If case 2 of phase 1 applies on the equilibrium path, then x ∈ φ(RN ).
Proof. When case 2 of phase 1 applies, there is only one agent j who has chosen a positive integer
in phase 1. In this case, agent j has an opportunity to change his report of zj > 0 into zj = 0 and
reach a subgame (Γ, RN ) that is played in phase 2–1. Let mN ∈ MN be the strategy profile induced
by m∗N for the subgame (Γ, RN ), and let x
′ be the allocation such that x′ = g(mN ). Since mN is a
subgame-perfect equilibrium for the subgame (Γ, RN ), it must be the case that x
′ ∈ SPE(Γ, RN ). Since
Γ implements φ in subgame-perfect equilibrium, we have the fact that x′ ∈ φ(RN ). Therefore, agent j
has an opportunity to realize the allocation x′ ∈ φ(RN ). Furthermore, every agent i ∈ N \ {j} has an
opportunity to realize any allocation in φ(RN ) by a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 2.
Nevertheless, the equilibrium allocation is x. So, it must be the case that every agent i weakly
prefers x to x′ ∈ φ(RN ), that is, for all i ∈ N , we have x Ri x′. Since x′ is a β∗-core allocation, we
must have the fact that x = x′.
Lemmas 2 through 4 prove the following proposition.
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prefers x to x′ ∈ φ(RN ), that is, for all i ∈ N , we have x Ri x′. Since x′ is a β∗-core allocation, we
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Proposition 2. We have the fact that SPE (Γ∗, RN ) ⊂ φ(RN ) for all RN ∈ RN .
3–3. Proof: φ(RN) ⊂ SPE(Γ∗,RN) for all RN ∈ RN .
Choose any arbitrary RN ∈ RN and fix it throughout this section. Take any x ∈ φ(RN ). We now
consider the game (Γ∗, RN ) and its subgames.
We first focus on subgames17 that start at the beginning of phase 2–1, where the β∗-core mechanism
Γ is played by all agents. Recall that at the beginning of Section 3–1, we have been given the mechanism
Γ that consists of the set of strategy profiles of all agents MN , the associated outcome allocation
function g : MN → X, and the set of participants at the initial node T = N . Since we have the fact
that SPE(Γ, RN ) = φ(RN ) and hence x ∈ SPE (Γ, RN ), we can choose a strategy profile mN ∈ MN for
(Γ, RN ) such that g(mN ) = x and mN is a subgame-perfect equilibrium for (Γ, RN ). We later use this
strategy profile mN to define a strategy profile for (Γ
∗, RN ).
We next focus on subgames18 that start at the beginning of round 1 in phase 2–2. We call each of
such subgames subgame t where t is the initial node of this subgame, that is, t is the very first node
that is reached in phase 2–2. Let St1 be the set of non-participants at the node t. Note that each
subgame t is a finite extensive game with perfect information, which is played by agents in St1. So, by
the theorem due to Kuhn [1953], we can choose a strategy profile mtSt1
for subgame t such that mtSt1
is a
subgame-perfect equilibrium for subgame t. We later use this strategy profile mtSt1
to define a strategy
profile for (Γ∗, RN ).
We now define a strategy profile m∗N ∈ M∗N for (Γ∗, RN ) as follows.
The strategy profile m∗N ∈ M∗N .
Phase 1. For each agent i, his report is such that (zi, RiN , x
i) = (0, RN , x).
Phase 2–1. For each subgame that starts at the beginning of phase 2–1, the strategy profile
induced by m∗N coincides with mN .
Phase 2–2. For each subgame t that starts at the beginning of round 1 in phase 2–2, the strategy




Lemma 5. The strategy profile m∗N is a subgame-perfect equilibrium for (Γ
∗, RN ) and its outcome
allocation is x.
17We note that there are many such subgames depending on reports (RiN , x
i)i∈N in phase 1.
18We note that there are many such subgames depending on reports (zi, RiN , x
i)i∈N in phase 1.
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Proof. It is easy to see that the outcome allocation for the strategy profile m∗N is x because for
this strategy profile, case 1 of phase 1 applies and the play proceeds to phase 2–1, where the strategy
profile mN is played in the β
∗-core mechanism Γ.
We shall show that m∗N is a subgame-perfect equilibrium for (Γ
∗, RN ).
First, for each subgame that starts at the beginning of phase 2–1, the strategy profile induced by
m∗N coincides with mN , which is a subgame-perfect equilibrium for this subgame.
Next, for each subgame t that starts at the beginning of round 1 in phase 2–2, the strategy profile
induced by m∗N coincides with m
t
St1
, which is a subgame-perfect equilibrium for this subgame.
So, we are left to show that each agent i’s report (zi, RiN , x
i) = (0, RN , x) is his optimal choice in
phase 1 given the strategies m∗N\{i} of the other agents. Suppose that only agent j deviates unilaterally
and chooses (zj , RjN , x
j) ̸= (0, RN , x). If zj = 0, then case 1 of phase 1 applies and the play proceeds
to phase 2–1, where the outcome allocation cannot be preferred to x = g(mN ) for agent j. If z
j ̸= 0,
then case 2 of phase 1 applies and the outcome allocation is x′ ≡ h(atj , aN\{j}(RN , xj(RN ))) where a
t
j
is chosen by agent j for his own benefit at the terminal node t. Since x ∈ φ(RN ), we have the fact
that xRj xj(RN ) by the definition of xj(RN ). Furthermore, we have the fact that xj(RN )Rj x
′ by the
definition of aN\{j}(RN , xj(RN )). So, we obtain xRj x
′, which means that agent j cannot gain by the
deviation such that zj ̸= 0.
Discussions of this section prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3. We have the fact that φ(RN ) ⊂ SPE (Γ∗, RN ) for all RN ∈ RN .
Propositions 2 and 3 complete the proof of the theorem.
4. Conclusion
This paper has pursued a solution to problems of non-participation in a general allocation model. We
have proposed how to redesign β∗-core mechanisms to overcome non-participation problems.
Our redesigned mechanisms have the following properties that have been missed in mechanisms in
the standard literature. First, agents are given opportunities to show willingness not to participate in
β∗-core mechanisms, possibly by passing over such willingness in silence. Second, ‘non-participation
decisions’ are used as messages for the redesigned mechanisms. Third, the redesigned mechanisms
respect the rights of non-participants in the sense that the mechanisms never interfere with actions
of non-participants. In spite of these properties, the redesigned mechanisms can implement a sub-
16
－ 135 －
A solution to problems of non-participation in β＊-core mechanisms
Proof. It is easy to see that the outcome allocation for the strategy profile m∗N is x because for
this strategy profile, case 1 of phase 1 applies and the play proceeds to phase 2–1, where the strategy
profile mN is played in the β
∗-core mechanism Γ.
We shall show that m∗N is a subgame-perfect equilibrium for (Γ
∗, RN ).
First, for each subgame that starts at the beginning of phase 2–1, the strategy profile induced by
m∗N coincides with mN , which is a subgame-perfect equilibrium for this subgame.
Next, for each subgame t that starts at the beginning of round 1 in phase 2–2, the strategy profile
induced by m∗N coincides with m
t
St1
, which is a subgame-perfect equilibrium for this subgame.
So, we are left to show that each agent i’s report (zi, RiN , x
i) = (0, RN , x) is his optimal choice in
phase 1 given the strategies m∗N\{i} of the other agents. Suppose that only agent j deviates unilaterally
and chooses (zj , RjN , x
j) ̸= (0, RN , x). If zj = 0, then case 1 of phase 1 applies and the play proceeds
to phase 2–1, where the outcome allocation cannot be preferred to x = g(mN ) for agent j. If z
j ̸= 0,
then case 2 of phase 1 applies and the outcome allocation is x′ ≡ h(atj , aN\{j}(RN , xj(RN ))) where a
t
j
is chosen by agent j for his own benefit at the terminal node t. Since x ∈ φ(RN ), we have the fact
that xRj xj(RN ) by the definition of xj(RN ). Furthermore, we have the fact that xj(RN )Rj x
′ by the
definition of aN\{j}(RN , xj(RN )). So, we obtain xRj x
′, which means that agent j cannot gain by the
deviation such that zj ̸= 0.
Discussions of this section prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3. We have the fact that φ(RN ) ⊂ SPE (Γ∗, RN ) for all RN ∈ RN .
Propositions 2 and 3 complete the proof of the theorem.
4. Conclusion
This paper has pursued a solution to problems of non-participation in a general allocation model. We
have proposed how to redesign β∗-core mechanisms to overcome non-participation problems.
Our redesigned mechanisms have the following properties that have been missed in mechanisms in
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of non-participants. In spite of these properties, the redesigned mechanisms can implement a sub-
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correspondence of the β∗-core in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
In our redesigned mechanisms, the prefix component consisting of phases 1 and 2–2 plays an im-
portant role for inducing participation of agents. The component works as a device for prompting
cooperation among agents.
However, the component works properly only for β∗-core mechanisms. It is still unknown whether
there is a way to induce participation of all agents in mechanisms that aim to attain allocations not in
the β∗-core.
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